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Public debate continues over whether the United States should impose a mandatory labeling
policy for genetically modified (GM) foods.  Favoring a mandatory labeling policy for GM foods are such
groups as Greenpeace (1997), Friends of the Earth (2001), and Consumer’s Union (1999).  Opposing a
mandatory labeling policy for GM foods are the Council for Biotechnology information (2001) and the
United States Food and Drug Administration (2001).  This is a contentious issue, engaging debate from
all sides of the spectrum, yet there has been modest economic work done to examine the merits and
pitfalls of a mandatory labeling policy for genetically modified foods in the United States.
This paper examines the welfare effects of imposing a mandatory labeling policy in the United
States for GM foods. We design an experiment using the tools of survey design, statistical experimental
design, and the random nth-price auction to explore whether consumers understand the signals sent from a
voluntary labeling policy relative to how they read signals from a mandatory labeling policy. We show
that if consumers understand correctly the signals sent in each market, a mandatory labeling policy for
GM foods results in welfare losses compared to a voluntary labeling policy.  Our results suggest that a
representative consumer from two Midwest cities interpreted the signals sent from voluntary and
mandatory markets identically.  These findings do not reject the view that US should continue with its
voluntary labeling policy and resist calls by the anti-biotechnology groups for mandatory labeling of
genetically modified foods.
Background on GM-labels and GM-labeling policies
Caswell (1998, 2000) has shown that the list of potential GM labeling policies is sizeable, and
includes mandatory labeling of GM foods, voluntary labeling of GM foods, or bans on all labeling.  The
policies that each country chooses are likely to be determined by competitive interest group politics
(Olsen, 1965). An informed decision about labeling policies for genetically modified foods should only
be done after a careful benefit/cost analysis.  Caswell points out that a voluntary labeling program is
likely to be a better policy option for a country that has only a small segment of the population that is
concerned about GM foods, while a mandatory labeling system is likely the best policy option in2
countries where most of the population wants to know if their food is genetically modified.  A model by
Krichhoff and Zago (2001) reached a similar conclusion--mandatory GM-labeling policies may be better
for more GM-averse consumers, while a voluntary GM-labeling policies may be better for a country that
has more consumers who are concerned with cost savings.
The United States does not require mandatory labeling for most genetically modified foods.  In
January 2001, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) issued a “Guidance for Industry” statement
for labeling GM products.  In this the FDA stated that the only GM foods that need to be labeled are ones
that have different characteristics from the non-GM version.  Labeling is not required for any other GM
foods, but firms in the United States do have the option of voluntarily indicating whether their food is
genetically modified.  Canada also has a similar voluntary labeling policy.
The European Union (EU) requires that all foods have the label “genetically modified” if any
ingredient in the food is at least one percent GM.  The European Parliament voted for stricter regulations
in early 2001.  The new regulations call for stricter labeling and monitoring of GM products, and allows
for the tracing of GM products through the food chain (CNN, 2001).  The EU standards are the minimum
standards that member countries must adhere to, although countries can have stricter standards.  Several
other countries around the world have mandatory labeling policies for GM foods, including Australia,
Japan, and New Zealand.  For a detailed review of labeling policies, see Rousu and Huffman (2001) or
Phillips and McNeil (2000).
Benefits and Costs of Mandatory and Voluntary labeling Policies
Studies have shown that benefits from mandatory labeling of GM foods are possible.  Greenpeace
and Friends of the Earth both advocate labels on GM foods to give consumers the opportunity to choose
whether to consume GM foods.  Many environmental and consumer advocacy groups call for mandatory
labeling, which they believe benefits consumers (Greenpeace, 1997; Friends of the Earth, 2001;
Consumer Reports, 1999).
The United States Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, has analyzed the
potential benefits of labels on foods (Golan et. al. 2000).  One benefit is making it easy to find content-3
information on food products. Labeling of foods can lead to more informed choices by consumers.  Also,
some firms may want to avoid the prospect of placing a label that has negative connotations which could
lead firms to improve their product.
Caswell and Padberg (1992) recommended a comprehensive view of the benefits of labels on
food products.  These benefits can be above and beyond what are normally considered the typical benefits
from labels.  The benefits from food labels include increased consumer information, improved product
design, and more consumer confidence in product quality.  Also, labels can provide an option value, even
for consumers who do currently read food labels.  This option value exists because if a food is labeled,
consumers always have the option to view the label, either now or in the future, and that option has some
value.
While benefits might exist, implementing a mandatory labeling policy for genetically modified
foods could be costly.  Biotechnology firms oppose mandatory labeling for all GM foods because they do
not think foods should be specially labeled unless the food is inherently different from the conventional
product (Council for Biotechnology Information, 2001).  The United States Department of Agriculture,
Economic Research Service listed costs associated with implementing a labeling policy (Golan et al.
2000), which are significant.  Identity preservation, to determine whether a particular food is GM, has
significant fixed costs.   When segregation is achieved, it increases the probability that the wrong product
will be delivered to a buyer.  For example, in the United States GM corn that was not approved for human
consumption, known as Starlink corn, got into the U.S. food system in late 2000.  Another possible cost is
accidental contamination of non-GM crops by their GM counterpart.  Farmers have to go to great lengths
to ensure that non-GM crops are not accidentally contaminated with the GM variety.  Among the things
farmers need to do to ensure there is no contamination is to have buffer zones, that is zones between the
GM and non-GM crops to prevent contamination.  Farmers also need to make sure planting and
harvesting equipment are not contaminated with any residue from GM crops.  All of these items imply
real costs when a labeling policy is implemented.4
These added labeling and storage costs would lead to higher prices for consumers (and possibly
lower prices to producers).  The higher prices would affect all consumers, and therefore would be like a
regressive tax, because the poor spend a larger share of their income for food than do high-income
households.  In addition to the poor having to pay for labeled food, the poor and less educated are less
likely to benefit from food labels.  This leads to what the USDA labeled, a “reverse Robin Hood effect”
of taking money from the poor to benefit the rich.
Labeling could change an industry’s structure (Golan et. al. 2000).  With some fixed costs
associated with labeling, small firms may have higher per unit labeling costs than large firms.  This would
mean increasing returns to scale, and an incentive for firms to get larger, or close down.  A labeling policy
that decreases the number of firms could decrease competition and might increase prices for consumers.
Another cost firms could face is reformulation costs, which could be large.
The USDA suggests that adding more information to food labels dilutes the other information
given on the label.  This concern seems most important when the labeling policy being considered would
inform consumers of an attribute that may not impact human health, e.g. genetic modification.
Furthermore, labeling without independent verification is unlikely to be useful.  A new labeling policy
would require resources for government or third party verification.
There are relatively few estimates of the costs of GM food labeling.  The accounting/consulting
firm KPMG was commissioned for a study in Australia and New Zealand to examine the costs of
complying with a new labeling law.  They estimated that the costs of the labeling laws could mean an
increase in consumer prices from 0.5% to 15%, and that firms could also face lower profits (Phillips and
Foster, 2000).  Even though they commissioned the study, the Australian New Zealand Food Standards
Council (2001) disregarded KPMG’s input, citing two flaws.  Whether this council had legitimate
problems with the study, or were doing the easy thing politically, we do not know.   Phillips and Smyth
(2000) estimated that a voluntary identity preserved production and marketing system in Canada cost
from 13-15% during 1995-1996.  The Philippine Chamber of Food Manufacturers warned that mandatory
GM food labels would increase production costs by 15%, and that the increased costs would be passed on5
to consumers (AgBiotech Reporter, August 2001).  One thing seems apparent; implementing a labeling
policy on genetically modified foods is costly, even if the exact magnitude of the costs is unknown.
Empirical Model
We develop a single period model to examine the welfare effects of alternative labeling policies.
Following the model of food certification in Crespi and Marette (2001) and the model on GM-labeling by
Krichhoff and Zago (2001), our model compares the welfare of a mandatory GM-labeling policy to the
welfare of voluntary GM-labeling policy.  Assume a firm produces one of two products, GM food or non-
GM food.  Without loss of generality, assume a firm could produce the GM food at marginal cost of zero,
while the marginal cost of non-GM food is  0 > c .  There are also laboratory costs to test for GM content.
Assume firms that have a product tested to determine the genetically modified status of their product
incur a marginal cost of  0 > t .
Assume firms know whether their products are genetically modified.  Suppose a sufficient
number of firms exist such that when proper signals are available, many firms would be producing GM
foods and many firms would be producing non-GM foods.  Firms compete by Bertrand competition (by
setting prices) so to examine the welfare effects of different labeling policies, one needs only look at the
gains to consumers.  This is because under Bertrand competition, firms earn zero profits so they are
indifferent to labeling policies.
All consumers have a value  0 > f  for a food product (GM or non-GM).  This could be thought
of as the value consumers place on not starving.  In addition, tastes for non-GM foods are assumed to be
uniformly distributed across consumers, denoted by  [ ] 1 , 0 ˛ q .  For consumers who buy non-GM foods at
a price of  NGM p , their indirect utility is  NGM p f - + q .  For consumers who buy GM foods at a price of
GM p , their indirect utility is  GM p f - .  For ease of welfare analysis, simplify the mass of consumers to
one.  Assume no positive or negative externalities of one consumer on another.
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Consider a baseline case where no labeling of products is allowed.  Because non-GM foods are
costlier than GM foods, only GM foods will be offered.  GM foods will be offered at a price of zero,
because Bertrand competition brings price down to marginal cost.  The reason there is no non-GM food
when labeling is banned is that no way exists for consumers to distinguish between GM and non-GM
foods.  A premium cannot be charged for non-GM foods, which is needed to cover the higher costs of
producing non-GM foods.  A consumer’s total surplus is  f .  This outcome occurs because a separating
equilibrium is unavailable, and non-GM foods can not be accurately signaled, leading to the classic
“lemons” problem (Akerlof, 1970).  This problem could also occur in a voluntary labeling regime if
testing costs are too high.  We next consider the welfare effects of alternative labeling policies: a
mandatory GM-labeling policy where all food products must be tested and a voluntary labeling policy,
where firms wishing to label their products as non-GM must have their products tested.  All cases assume
the regulator incurs a per unit cost for certification and passes that cost onto firms: a discussion of fixed
certification costs follows this analysis.
Mandatory labeling policy – All products must be tested
Consider a mandatory GM labeling policy where all food products must be tested to determine if
they are genetically modified.  Goods that are genetically modified will be labeled as “genetically
modified.”  Foods that are not genetically modified will not be labeled (although labeling these products
as non-GM does not change the analysis).  A GM product has a constant marginal cost (and price) of t,
and a non-GM product has a marginal cost (and price) of  t c+ .
2  The consumer surplus of individual j
who purchases non-GM foods is:
(1) p f CS
j j - + =q .
The consumer surplus for all consumers who purchase non-GM foods is then:
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Where  ML q  is the value of q  where consumers are indifferent between consuming non-GM and GM
foods under a mandatory labeling policy.  Consumer surplus for individual j who purchases GM foods is:
(3) p f CS
j - = .
Aggregate consumer surplus of those who purchase GM foods is:
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Voluntary labeling policy, only non-GM foods need to be tested
Consider a voluntary labeling policy, where only the products that are to be labeled as non-GM
need to be tested.  Non-GM products are labeled as non-GM.  GM products are not labeled, and
consumers will see this as a signal that these foods are GM. Once again, the marginal cost of testing a
product is  0 > t .  Now a GM product has a price of 0, while a non-GM product has the same price of
t c + .  Consumer surplus of an individual who purchases non-GM foods is the same under either policy,
as shown in equation (1).  Aggregate consumer surplus of those who will purchase non-GM foods is:
(5) ( ) ( ) ￿ ￿ - - + = - + =
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VL q  is the value of q  when consumers are indifferent between consuming non-GM and GM foods under
a mandatory labeling policy.  Consumer surplus for individual j who purchases GM foods under a
voluntary policy is:
6) f p f CS
j = - = .
Therefore aggregate consumer surplus of those who purchase GM foods is:8
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Consider a third possible labeling policy, where genetically modified products must be labeled as
such, and non-GM products are not labeled.  For this policy, however, only those products wanting to
avoid the label of “genetically modified” need to be tested.  Firms that do not test will be forced to label
their foods as genetically modified.  Once again, the marginal cost of testing a product is  0 > t .  For this
case, a GM product will have a price of 0, while a non-GM product has a price of  a t + .  This mandatory
labeling policy gives the same welfare as the voluntary labeling policy.
One can state that consumer welfare is greater under the voluntary labeling policy.  If one
considers only consumers and firms in a model (and not third party groups), then a voluntary labeling
policy for GM foods Pareto dominates a mandatory policy.  This is because voluntary and mandatory
labeling policies send the same signal, but additional testing and segregation costs occur under a
mandatory policy.  This model only assumed that food testing would imply a higher marginal cost, when
other costs of a mandatory labeling policy are also considered, such as a possible increase in market
concentration, mistakes in labeling, and dilution of the other information on the food label (Golan et al.
2000), it strengthens the prediction that a voluntary labeling policy yields higher welfare than a
mandatory policy.
In a market structure where firms compete by quantity (Cournot model), one gets the same result
if the number of firms producing GM foods and non-GM foods stays the same when a switch is made
from a voluntary policy to a mandatory policy.  A change from a voluntary to a mandatory labeling policy
has no effect for an individual who consumes non-GM foods and a decrease in welfare for those who
consume GM-foods.  Under the Cournot model however, firms that produced GM-foods would earn
lower profits under the mandatory policy.  The result that a voluntary labeling policy yields higher
welfare than a mandatory labeling policy appears to be robust to the type of model used to analyze the
problem.9
Where the regulator incurs a fixed cost for testing in a mandatory labeling policy, and passes the
cost along to producers, passing it along as a fixed user fee is always less efficient than passing the costs
along as a per-unit user fee (Crespi and Marette, 2001).  Therefore, an efficient certification process will
result in the regulator splitting the fixed cost into per-unit user fees, and the analysis for the per-unit
certification cost applies.
Many environmental groups are calling for a mandatory labeling policy on GM foods
(Greenpeace 1997, Friends of the Earth, 2001).  This is despite the fact that consumers could purchase
non-GM foods under a voluntary labeling policy by looking for foods with a non-GM label on it.  This
model presents an explanation for this behavior.  Suppose the utility of environmental groups is positively
related to the number of individuals who consume non-GM foods (and negatively related to the number of
individuals who consume GM foods).  A mandatory labeling policy imposes additional costs for testing
on GM foods, and therefore increases the number of individuals who would purchase non-GM foods.
The passage of a mandatory GM-labeling law would increase the utility of environmental groups.
When will a voluntary labeling policy not allow for signals?
When testing to see if a product is made using genetic modification, no one will consume non-
GM foods if the test is too costly.  For any consumer that has  0 < - - a C q , he will not purchase the
non-GM food, because he is better off buying the GM food and obtaining a consumer surplus of f.  So if
the consumer who places the highest value on non-GM food ( 1 = q ) finds it too costly to purchase non-
GM foods, ( 1 > + a C ), he/she will buy non-GM foods.
This analysis implicitly assumes that consumers can distinguish the signal that a food is GM (or
non-GM) equally well.  This is a contentious point that many groups, including Greenpeace (1997) and
Friends of the Earth (2001), strongly disagree with.  These groups are calling for a mandatory labeling
policy in the United States because, as Greenpeace (1997) puts it, “customers must have the right to
know.”  We conduct experiment auctions to see if consumers behave as if they see the same signal under10
alternative labeling regimes or if consumers read the signals differently. A discussion of the experimental
design follows.
Experimental Design
The on-going GM-labeling debate has been fueled by information provided by proponents and
opponents of mandatory labeling. Proponents of voluntary labeling policies say they are less expensive,
because only the firms that wish to label their products must incur the labeling costs.  In a mandatory-
labeling regime, all firms would need to incur additional costs, whether the costs are due to product
testing, label design, segregation, mistakes in labeling, etc.  Many proponents of mandatory labeling of
GM foods say that consumers have a “right to know” what they are eating and proponents claim that
governments should mandate labels for foods made through genetic modification.
With this general background in mind, we design a new set of six treatments that complement our
earlier work (Huffman et al., 2002; Rousu et al., 2002) by incorporating the private-information-revealing
feature of experimental auction markets and the rigorous randomized treatment design of statistical
experimental design (also see Hoffman et al. 1993, Fox et al. 1998).  We designed a set of experimental
auctions in which adult consumers who are randomly assigned to the various treatments bid on actual
foods that differed only by the types of labels on the foods.  Some consumers bid on foods with positive
GM-labels—the labels that would arise in a mandatory labeling regime; others bid on food with negative
GM-labels—the labels that would arise in a voluntary labeling regime.
The experimental design consisted of four biotech information-labeling treatments with each
treatment replicated at least twice.  The treatments were randomly assigned to ten experimental units,
each consisting of 13 to 16 consumers drawn from the households of two major urban areas and who were
paid to participate.  We anticipated that a sample size of 135 to 145 participants was necessary for finding
statistically significant results, which was not prohibitively costly.  Using randomly chosen consumers
from the population of an urban area, rather than undergraduate college students at a university, is seen as
an advantage when it comes to making inferences, however cautious, from the experiments to the11
Midwest or whole U.S. population (also see the comments in Lusk et al. 2001).   Conducting experiments
in two urban areas rather than one is also seen as enhancing credibility of our results by showing that the
experiments can be replicated across urban areas.
We now describe the four elements in our GM labeling experiments—the GM food, the auction
mechanism, the experimental units, and the specific steps in the experiment which includes the detailed
information labels.  Consider each in turn.
We anticipated that consumers might react differently to GM content for foods of different types.
Believing that one food item was unlikely to reveal enough information, we settled on three items:
vegetable oil,
3 tortilla chips (made from yellow corn), and Russet potatoes.  In the distilling and refining
process for vegetable oils, essentially all of the proteins (which are the components of DNA and source of
genetic modification) are removed leaving pure lipids.  Minimal human health concerns should arise from
consumption of the oil, but people might still fear that the production of GM foods could harm the natural
environment.  Tortilla chips are highly processed foods that may be made from GM or non-GM corn, and
consumers might have human health or environmental concerns or both.  Russet potatoes are purchased as
a fresh product and generally baked or fried before eating.  Consumers might reasonably see the potential
concentration of genetic modification as being higher in potatoes than in processed corn chips.
Consumers might see both human health and environmental risks from eating Russet potatoes.  Now we
will discuss the auction mechanism used for the experiment.
Valuation experiments use an auction mechanism to induce people to reveal their preferences for
new goods and services (e.g., see Shogren et al. 1994).  We again used the random nth-price auction for
our GM-food experiments because it is designed to engage both the on- and off-the-margin bidders (see
Shogren et al. 2001).
4  The random nth-price works as follows.  Each of k bidders submits a bid for one
unit of a good; then each of the bids is rank-ordered from highest to lowest.  The auction monitor then
selects a random number—the n in the nth-price auction, which is drawn from a uniform distribution
between 2 and k, and the auction monitor sells one unit of the good to each of the n-1 highest bidders at
the nth-price.  For instance, if the monitor randomly selects n = 4, the three highest bidders each purchase12
one unit of the good priced at the fourth-highest bid.  Ex ante, bidders who have low or moderate
valuations now have a nontrivial chance to buy the good because the price is determined randomly.  This
auction increases the probability that insincere bidding will be costly.
Auctions were planned and conducted at two Midwestern U.S. cities, Des Moines, IA, and St.
Paul, MN. The Iowa State University Statistics Laboratory was paid $3,700 to identify the sample.
Approximately twelve hundred randomly selected residence telephone numbers were called in the two
cities by employees of the ISU Statistics Laboratory.  They checked to make sure it was a real family
residence, asked to speak with an adult in the household (i.e., a person who was 18 years of age or older),
3  and asked if he/she was willing to participate in a group session in Des Moines (St. Paul) that related
“to how people select food and household products.”  They were told that the sessions were to be held on
Saturday, April 7
th (April 21
st), 2001, and informed that the session would last about 90 minutes.  They
were also told that at the end of the session each participant would receive $40 in cash for their time.
The lab experiments were conducted in April and December of 2001, and potential participants
were informed that the sessions would last about 90 minutes.
5  There were ten experimental units, four in
April, and six in December.  The four trials from April were also used in Rousu et al (2002) and Huffman
et al (2001).  The other six trials were conducted in December, and their results have not been included in
previous papers.  Individuals who were called had the option of participating at one of three starting
times: 9 am, 11:30 am, and 2 pm.  From the initial sample of randomly selected numbers, the percentage
of people who accepted the offer to participate and then showed up to the auction was approximately
eight percent – and this number is not adjusted for unusable phone numbers (which would increase the
response rate percentage).  Considering that many surveys have response rates that are approximately
15% (for example Lusk, Roosen, and Fox, 2002) and that our participants had to forgo a good portion of
their Saturday to participate, our response rate seems quite reasonable.  Our total sample size of
participants is 142.  Next is a step-by-step discussion of the auction.
Figure 1 shows the ten steps in each experimental unit.  In step 1 when participants arrived at the
experiment, they signed a consent form agreeing to participate in the auction.  After they signed this form,13
they were given $40 for participating and an ID number to preserve the participants’ anonymity.  The
participants then read brief instructions and filled out a questionnaire.
In step 2, participants were given detailed instructions about how the random nth-price auction
works, including an example written on the blackboard.  After the participants learned about the auction,
a short quiz was given to participants to ensure that everyone understood how the auction worked.   All
experimental instructions are available from the authors on request.
Step 3 was the first practice round of bidding, in which participants bid on a brand-name candy
bar.  The participants were all asked to examine the product, and then place a bid on the candy bar.  The
bids were collected and the first round of practice bidding was over. Throughout the auctions, when the
participants were bidding on items in a round, they had no indication of what other items they may be
bidding on in future rounds.
Step 4 was the second practice round of bidding, and in this round the participants bid separately
on three different items.  The products were the same brand-name candy bar, a deck of playing cards, and
a box of pens.  Participants knew that only one of the two rounds would be chosen at random to be
binding, which prevented anyone from taking home more than one unit of any product.  By only round
binding, we avoid problems of demand reduction that can occur in multi-unit auctions.  The consumers
first examined the three products and then submitted their bids.
After the two practice auction rounds were completed, the binding round and the binding nth-
prices were revealed in step 5.  All bid prices were written on the blackboard, and the nth-price was
circled for each of the three products.  Participants could see immediately what items they won, and the
price they would pay.  The participants were told that the exchange of money for goods was in another
room nearby, and would take place after the entire experiment was completed.
In step 6, participants received one of two potential info-packets that provided non-food-label
information about biotechnology (for a detailed look at how information affected the demand for foods
labeled as genetically modified, see Rousu et. al. 2002).  These info-packets were produced as follows.
We created three information sources: (1) the industry perspective—a collection of statements and14
information on genetic modification provided by a group of leading biotechnology companies, including
Monsanto and Syngenta;  (2) the environmental group perspective—a collection of statements and
information on genetic modification from Greenpeace, a leading environmental group; and (3) the
independent, third party perspective—a statement on genetic modification approved by a third party
group, consisting of a variety of people knowledgeable about genetically modified goods, including
scientists, professionals, religious leaders, and academics, who do not have a financial stake in genetically
modified foods.  We limited each information source to one full page, organized into five categories:
general information, scientific impact, human impact, financial impact, and environmental impact.  The
actual sheets given to participants are available from the authors upon request.
These information sources were then randomized to create the two info-packets: (1) both pro and
anti-biotechnology and (2) pro-biotechnology, anti-biotechnology, and independent verifiable
6.  These
info-packets were then randomized among all ten experimental units, with each info-packet going to four
experimental units.  By giving all participants both positive and negative information on GM foods, and
by giving some participants a third-party perspective on GM foods, we are finding out the willingness to
pay for individuals who have received all sides of the story on GM foods.
Once the appropriate info-packet was distributed to the participants in a given unit, two auction
rounds were then conducted. The rounds were differentiated by the food label—either the food had a
standard food label or a label that indicated the status of genetic modification, as shown for potatoes in
Figure 2.
7  In one round (which could be round 1 or 2 depending on experimental unit),
 participants were
bidding on the three food products each with the standard food label.  We made these labels as plain as
possible to avoid any influence on the bids from the label design.  In the other round, participants were
bidding on the same three food products with either a GM label or a non-GM label.  The GM and non-
GM labels differed from the standard label only by the inclusion of only one extra sentence.  The GM
label said “This product is made using genetic engineering,” while the non-GM label said “This product is
made without genetic engineering.”  For each experimental unit, participants knew that only one round
would be chosen as the binding round that determined auction winners.15
In step 7, participants bid on three different food products: a bag of potatoes, a bottle of vegetable
oil, and a bag of tortilla chips, either with the standard or label indicating the product’s GM status.   Six
groups bid on foods with plain labels and foods with labels saying “made using genetic modification”.
Four groups bid on foods with plain labels and foods with labels saying “made without using genetic
modification.”  The participants were instructed to examine the three products, and then to write down
their sealed bid for each of the three goods.  Participants bid on each good separately.  The monitor then
collected the bids from the people, and then told them they were next going to look at another group of
food items.  Figure 3 summarizes the ten experimental units.
Step 8 had participants examine the same three food products, each with a different label from
round 1.
8  Again the participants examined the products, and bid on the three products separately.  The
bids were then collected from all of the individuals.
Step 9 selected the binding round, and the binding random nth-prices for the three goods.  The
winners were notified.  In step 10, each participant was asked to complete a brief post-auction
questionnaire and then the monitors dismissed the participants who did not win.  The monitors and the
winners then exchanged money for goods, and then the auction winners were also dismissed.
Data and Results
Table 1 summarizes the demographic characteristics of the 142 individuals who participated in
the auctions.  Sixty percent of the auction participants were female.  The mean age of participants was
51.4 (about average considering we only used adult consumers).  Almost two-thirds of the participants
were married.  The average participant had over two years of college education and the average
household size was 2.56.  The household income for participants was almost fifty-two thousand dollars,
and ninety-two percent of auction participants were white. The demographic characteristics of our
participants indicate that our experiments had a representative sample of the Midwest region of the United
States.
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Table 2 shows the mean and median bids.  Eighty-six participants were in treatments that bid on
the plain-labeled and GM-labeled food products while fifty-six participants were in treatments that bid on
the plain-labeled and non-GM labeled food products.  For the participants who bid on the GM-labeled and
plain-labeled foods, consumers discounted the GM-labeled oil by 11 cents, the GM-labeled chips by 8
cents and the GM-labeled potatoes by 8 cents.  The participants who bid on the plain-labeled food and the
non-GM food discounted the plain-labeled oil by 4 cents, the plain-labeled chips by 7 cents and the plain-
labeled potatoes by 9 cents.
Our main goal is to determine whether consumers can accurately decipher which food is GM
irrespective of the labeling treatment.  To determine whether consumers perceive the GM-signals
differently in the two markets, we first examine the difference in bids for the perceived-GM product to the
perceived-non-GM product.  In the treatment with GM-labels, the GM-labeled food is the perceived-GM
product; the plain-labeled food is the perceived-non-GM product.  In the treatment with non-GM labels,
the plain-labeled food is the perceived-GM product; the non-GM labeled food is the perceived-non-GM
product.
Table 3 presents results from a test of the null hypothesis that no difference in bids for the
perceived-GM and the perceived-non-GM bids exist.  For all three products, we reject the null hypothesis
that consumers’ bids for the perceived-GM and the perceived-non-GM foods are equal.  This result
suggests that the average consumer bids less for the food that is signaled as genetically modified, which
supports earlier finding reported by Huffman et al., 2001 and Lusk et al., 2001.
Table 4 presents results from tests of the null hypothesis that the bids for the perceived-GM and
non-GM products are equal across the two treatments.  Did consumers bid the same for the plain-labeled
product in the GM-labeled treatment as they did for the non-GM labeled product in the non-GM
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The null hypothesis in expression (8) tests the hypothesis that the bids for the perceived-GM foods are the
same in either labeling treatment.  The superscripts indicate the type of food product, the subscript
indicates the labeling treatment.  The null hypothesis in expression (9) tests the hypothesis that the bids
for the perceived-non-GM labeled foods are the same in both trails.   Table 4 shows that one cannot reject
the null hypothesis that the average bids are identical.  This suggests that consumers act as if they
accurately read the signals for which food is genetically modified under either a mandatory or a voluntary
labeling regime.
The size of the discount for the perceived-GM food provides additional evidence about
consumers perception of the signals from the two labeling regimes.  Null hypotheses that consumers did
not discount the perceived-GM food in the two markets differently were tested.  Table 5 shows the
results.  The first column shows the difference in bids in the GM-label trials, the second column shows
the difference in bids in the non-GM-label trials.  The third column is the difference between these
columns.  The absolute difference is 7 cents for vegetable oil; 1 cent for the tortilla chips; and 1 cent for
the potatoes.  At the five percent significance level, the tests show that one cannot reject the null
hypothesis that the difference in bids is zero for any of the three food products.
10  While none of the
differences are statistically significant, at first glance it is curious that the mean discount under positive or
negative labels is virtually identical for the tortilla chips and potatoes, yet it is considerably larger for the
vegetable oil.  A possible explanation for the vegetable oil having a 7-cent difference is the fact that we
had to use two different types of vegetable oils.
11
By consumers placing the same discount on the perceived GM food, whether the market used
positive GM food labels or negative GM food labels, provides additional evidence that consumers receive
the same signals in a voluntary labeling regime as in a mandatory labeling regime.  This adds validate to
the findings from the empirical analysis---a voluntary GM-labeling policy yields higher welfare than a
mandatory GM-labeling policy.  Hence, the United States has been prudent in avoiding calls to initiate a
mandatory GM-labeling policy.18
Conclusion
GM-food labeling remains an important and politically contentious issue in the US.  Many groups
call for mandatory labeling of GM foods; while many others want to keep labeling voluntary.  This paper
provides evidence, which supports the view that a voluntary labeling policy is more efficient than a
mandatory labeling policy in the United States.  The reason is that voluntary labeling policies are less
expensive and still give consumers the choice to consume GM or non-GM foods.  This result hinges on
consumer’s ability to read signals identically in either market, a conclusion that our auctions could not
reject.  One further avenue for research would be to examine the international dimension to GM food
labels, say in Europe or Australia.  For example do they read the same signals of genetic modification in
voluntary labeling markets as in mandatory labeling markets.  The key issue is relevance and usefulness
of the mandatory labeling policies throughout the world.19
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Figure 2: The three types of labels used for the potatoes
Russet Potatoes
Net weight 5 lb.
This product is made without
using genetic modification
Russet Potatoes
Net weight 5 lb.
Russet Potatoes
Net weight 5 lb.
This product is made using
genetic modification (GM)25
Figure 3: Information and labeling given to experimental units one through ten
Exp. unit GM Label Type Third-party Round with GM labels
1. negative label Yes 1
2. negative label Yes 2
3. negative label No 1
4. negative label No 2
5. negative label No 1
6 negative label No 2
7 positive label Yes 1
8 positive label Yes 2
9. positive label No 1
10. positive label No 226
Table 1. Characteristics of the Auction Participants
Variable Definition Mean St. Dev
Gender 1 if female 0.60 0.49
Age The participant’s age 51.4 18.1
Married 1 if the individual is married 0.65 0.48
Education Years of schooling 14.74 2.36
Household Number of people in participant’s household 2.56 1.49
Income The households income level (in thousands) 51.6 33.4
White 1 if participant is white 0.92 0.27
Read_L 1 if never reads labels before a new food purchase 0.02 0.14
1 if rarely reads labels before a new food purchase 0.11 0.32
1 if sometimes reads labels before a new food purchase 0.32 0.47
1 if often reads labels before a new food purchase 0.36 0.48
1 if always reads labels before a new food purchase 0.18 0.3927
Table 2.  Mean Bids
A.   Mean bids when participants bid on food with positive GM food labels.
n mean bid std. dev. Median Minimum Maximum
GM OIL 86 0.63 0.65 0.50 0 2.75
OIL 86 0.74 0.75 0.50 0 3.29
GM CHIPS 86 0.61 0.70 0.43 0 3.25
CHIPS 86 0.69 0.72 0.50 0 2.89
GM POTATOES 86 0.59 0.54 0.50 0 2.00
POTATOES 86 0.67 0.54 0.50 0 2.25
B.  Mean bids when participants bid on food with negative GM food labels.
n mean bid std dev Median Minimum Maximum
NGM OIL 56 0.80 0.80 0.50 0 4.75
OIL 56 0.76 0.68 0.50 0 3.00
NGM CHIPS 56 0.75 0.81 0.50 0 4.00
CHIPS 56 0.68 0.77 0.50 0 4.00
NGM POTATOES 56 0.84 0.75 0.75 0 4.00
POTATOES 56 0.75 0.70 0.68 0 4.0028
Table 3.  T-Test to examine whether bids for the “perceived” GM product are statistically
different than those for the perceived non-GM food
n=142
Difference T-Test Statistic
OIL 0.08 2.04 **
CHIPS 0.07 2.64 **
POTATES 0.09 3.31 **
Table 4.  T-Test to examine whether bids for “perceived” GM and non-GM foods are
different under alternative labeling regimes
n=142






GM OIL 0.74 0.80 0.06 1.10
NON-GM OIL 0.63 0.76 0.13 0.45
GM CHIPS 0.69 0.75 0.06 0.56
NON-GM CHIPS 0.61 0.68 0.07 0.53
GM POTATES 0.59 0.75 0.16 1.53
NON-GM POTATOES 0.67 0.84 0.17 1.57
Table 5.  T-Test to determine whether difference in bids are statistically different
Diff – GM Diff – Non GM Difference T-Test Statistic
Oil 0.11 0.04 0.07 0.90
Chips 0.08 0.07 0.01 0.03
Potatoes 0.09 0.08 0.01 0.2029
Endnotes
                                                          
1 There may also be fixed costs associated with testing food products for GM content, we, however, are
abstracting away from these costs.  They would introduce non-linearity into the decision process but
would not alter the predictions of the model.
2 This is where our model differs substantially from Kirchoff and Zago (2001) in the respect that we
assume that under a mandatory GM-labeling policy that firms producing products would need to pay a per
unit charge, while Kirchoff and Zago assume the government would pay for all testing charges in a
mandatory labeling regime.
3 For the oil, soybean oil was used for the positive GM label treatments, and canola oil was used for the
negative GM label treatments.  The soybean oil was initially used in the April experiments – we then tried
to find non-GM soybean oil in 32 oz. bottles and were unsuccessful.  The bids for the vegetable oil follow
the same trend as the other products, and will be discussed in the results section of the paper.  The other
products (and packaging) were absolutely identical, except for the presence or absence of genetic
modification.
4 The auction combines elements of two classic demand-revealing mechanisms: the Vickrey auction and
the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (1964) random pricing mechanism.  The key characteristic of the random
nth price auction is a random but endogenously determined market-clearing price.  Randomness is used to
give all participants a positive probability of being a purchaser of the auctioned good; the endogenous
price guarantees that the market-clearing price is related to the bidders’ private values.
5 We considered the possibility that the demand for genetically modified foods may change over the 8
months between auctions, so we replicated two experimental units, using the exact same procedures.  We
found no evidence that willingness to pay for GM-labeled foods had changed over time.  Note that
subjects were also told that at the end of the session each participant would receive $40 in cash for their
time.  The sessions were held at the Iowa State University Learning Connection, 7
th and Locust Street,
Des Moines (and lower level of the Classroom Office Building, University of Minnesota, St. Paul).  Three
different times were available each auction day, 9 am, 11:30 am, and 2 pm, and willing participants were30
                                                                                                                                                                                          
asked to choose a time that best fit their schedule. Participation per household was limited to two adult
individuals, and they were assigned to different groups.  To willing participants, the Statistics Laboratory
followed up by sending a letter containing more information, including a map and instructions on when
and where the meeting would be held, directions for getting there, and a telephone number to contact for
more information.
6 The order of the positive information and negative information was randomized across consumers.
Participants who received the third party, verifiable information always received it after the other
information sources.
7 Note that our labels are all on the front of the package, where consumers would surely see them.  Read
Noussair et al (2002) for evidence how consumers are not always likely to read labels on the back of
packages.
8 By replicating treatments and having one group bid on the plain-labeled foods in round one and the GM
(or non-GM) labeled foods in round two, we are controlling for any potential round effects.  The null
hypothesis that the round the consumer bid on foods led to the same bids could not be rejected at a 5%
percent level for any of the three goods under both a t-test and a Wilcoxon Rank-Sum test.  The order
consumers saw the items did not appear to matter.
9 Demographic information for both the St. Paul area (Ramsey County) and the city of Des Moines can be
found at Midwest Profiles (2001), at http://www.profiles.iastate.edu/.
10 Regression models were also run, testing whether any of the demographic characteristics made a
difference on the discount for the perceived GM food.  No demographic characteristics appeared to
impact the discount for the perceived GM food
11 To check the robustness of the results, we also ran Wilcoxon rank-sum tests to see if one could reject
that consumers had different behavior for the different label types.  The results for the Wilcoxon rank-
sum tests are similar to those of the t-test results, showing that one cannot reject the null hypothesis that
consumers perceive the signals from the two labeling policies the same. 